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The Emergence of New States in International Law:  
The Insights from Complexity Theory 





Doctrinal controversies and the disputed international status of 
Kosovo and Palestine suggest that it is difficult for us international 
lawyers to know with any certainty when a new State has emerged in 
the international community. The contention here is that we should 
look to systems theory thinking—specifically complexity theory—to 
make sense of the law on statehood. Systems theory directs us to 
conceptualize the State in terms of patterns of communications 
adopted by law and politics actors and institutions and applied to 
subjects. Complexity tells us that these patterns develop without any 
central controller or guiding hand and that they exist only as a 
consequence of the framing of law and politics communications by a 
third party observer. The argument developed in this article is that 
these insights can provide the intellectual “scaffold” around which we 





1. This article considers what should be a straightforward question: how do 
we (international lawyers) know when a new State has emerged? The existence 
of a number of “unrecognized States”, such as Somaliland and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the divided practice of recognition in 
relation to Kosovo and Palestine, along with doctrinal controversies as to the 
influence of the right of peoples to self-determination and other jus cogens 
norms on the law on statehood all suggest that, at present, it is difficult for us 
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to “know” with any certainty when a new State has emerged. We need then to 
clarify our thinking on the issue and the proposal here is that we should 
follow a long tradition in international law scholarship of looking to the 
methodologies developed by our colleagues in the natural sciences to make 
sense of the question—specifically that we should look to one variant of 
systems theory: complexity.  
 2. Complexity theory is a variant of systems theory thinking. The 
argument from general systems theory is that we can think of any collection of 
interacting objects, actors or agents as a “system”, and that all systems have 
certain shared characteristics, whether we are looking at the Solar System or a 
Criminal Justice System. The objective is to observe, frame and explain the 
patterned behaviours of objects, actors or agents. Systems theory thinking is 
now mainstream in international law,1 reflecting not only the reality that 
international law is a “system”,2 but also a recognition that systems theory as a 
distinctive methodology might help us solve, or at least make sense of, some 
of the practical questions that confront the discipline.  
 3. Complexity theory emerged in the natural sciences to explain the 
ways in which patterned order could emerge without the need for a “guiding 
hand” or “central controller”, as the structures of certain systems were seen to 
occur spontaneously—the result of the interactions of the parts of the system 
as they reacted to new information. Complexity theory has been used, inter 
alia, to explain the workings of insect colonies and the relationship between 
the mind (the emergent system) and the brain, which functions through 
individual neurons (agents) firing and making connections. It has also been 
relied on by certain social scientists, including international relations scholars. 
There is now a significant body of scholarly writing that seeks to apply the 
                                                        
1  See, for example, Anthony D’Amato, Groundwork for International Law 108 
American JIL (2014), 650, 650 (“International law is a system[:] [an] 
autopoietic system”). There are points in the analysis, however, where 
D’Amato uses concepts more readily identified with complexity theory. See 
also Anthony D’Amato, “Evolution of International Law: Two Thresholds, 
Maybe a Third”, in Papers from the 2009 AAAI Fall Symposium on 
Complex Adaptive Systems and the Threshold Effect [ 
aaai.org/ocs/index.php/FSS/FSS09/paper/view/988 (last visited 18 
September 2015)], 29 (“[international law] is a complex adaptive system”). 
See also Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: 
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law 25 
Michigan JIL (2004), 999. 
2  James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th 
edition (2012), 15 (“The reality of international law—whatever its theoretical 
underpinnings—is clearly that of a system of laws”). 
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insights from complexity theory to law,3 although hitherto complexity4 has 
had limited impact on international law scholarship,5 and this is the first work 
to examine its implications for the international law on statehood and 
recognition. 
 4. This article makes two claims: first, that international law is a 
complex system that emerges from the actions and interactions of States and 
other international law actors in their international relations; second, (and 
more importantly for these purposes) that we should model State as the 
coupling of the complex law and politics systems under a constitution. 
Drawing on developments in the natural sciences through an application of 
                                                        
3  See, for example, J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer 24 Georgia State 
University LR (2007-2008), 885, 897; J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a 
Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System: A Wake-Up Call For 
Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 Duke LJ (1995-
6), 849; Hope M. Babcock, Democracy’s Discontent in a Complex World: 
Cab Avalanches Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel’s Civic 
Republican Community? 85 Geo. LJ (1996-7), 2085; Gregory Todd Jones, 
Dynamical Jurisprudence: Law as a Complex System, 24 Georgia State 
University LR (2008), 873; Julian Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity: 
Complexity Theory & The Normative Reconstruction of Law, 52 Cleveland 
State LR (2005), 227; and Thomas E. Webb, Tracing an Outline of Legal 
Complexity, 27 Ratio Juris (2014), 477.  
4  Two dominant themes can be observed in the literature on complexity theory 
when applied in the social sciences. “Computational complexity” draws on 
the mathematical theory of complexity developed by computer scientists to 
develop computational models of complex systems, including law: see, for 
example, Eric Kades, The Laws Of Complexity And The Complexity Of 
Laws: The Implications Of Computational Complexity Theory For The Law 
49 Rutgers LR (1996–1997), 403. The second approach (and the one 
developed here) draws primarily on biology and is principally associated with 
the work of the Santa Fe Institute. There are, of course, other ways that the 
term can be used: Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, 
Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke LJ (1992), 1. 
5  Notable exceptions include Dominic McGoldrick, From “9-11” to the “Iraq 
War 2003”: International Law in an Age of Complexity (2004); Anna Carline 
and Zoe Pearson, Complexity and Queer Theory Approaches to 
International Law and Feminist Politics: Perspectives on Trafficking, 19 Can. 
J. Women & L. (2007), 73; Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? 
Emergence and Change in International Investment Law, 29 (2) ICSID 
Review (2014), 372; and Mark Chinen, Complexity Theory and the 
Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of State Responsibility, 25 European JIL 
(2014), 703.  
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the third wave of systems theory thinking known as complexity, the work 
outlines a model of State as the framing of the emergent patterned 
communications of co-evolved and co-existent law and politics systems. In 
contradistinction to much of the systems theory literature, law and politics are 
understood to be open, emergent, complex systems: the patterned 
communications of the systems are a consequence of the actions of 
constituent agents; their interactions with each other; and interactions with 
other actors and systems in the external environment. The argument is that 
we should understand the emergence of new States in terms of the emergence 
of complex systems of law and politics at the domestic level through the 
cognitive frame of the complex international law system——and that this 
model can provide the “scaffold” around which we can build our model of 
the international law on statehood.6  
 5. The work begins by briefly outlining the central disagreements in the 
academic literature on the international law on statehood, concluding that the 
differences reflect a problem familiar to scientific enquiry, i.e. the function (if 
any) of a third party observer and the cognitive frame through which the issue 
is addressed. The article also observes the influence of the metaphorical 
framing of State as Person, which underpins the importance of effectivité and the 
rejection of the possibility of relativism in the international law status of 
States. There is nothing intrinsically wrong in relying on metaphor to develop 
and defend doctrinal positions; the trick, as Vaughan Lowe observes, “is 
finding the right metaphor”.7  
 6. The argument here is that we should think about the emergence of 
new States in terms of the emergence of new law and politics systems——and 
that the insights developed in the natural sciences to explain the emergence of 
complex systems can help us to be clear about the ways in which international 
lawyers can understand the emergence of new States. After explaining the 
ideas of complexity theory and the complex adaptive system, the work 
develops and defends a concept of State as the joining of the (complex) law 
and politics systems under a constitution. The claim is that this model of State 
can help us to understand the ways in which new States emerge by telling us 
what we should be looking for (patterns of law and politics), and helping us 
make sense of what we are looking at (the exercise of independent political 
power through law). The analysis also makes clear the importance of 
acknowledging the cognitive frame through which the issue will be 
                                                        
6  Cf. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 
American JIL (1983), 413 (“A system builder by vocation, the jurist cannot 
dispense with a minimum of conceptual scaffolding”). 
7  Vaughan Lowe, International Law (2007), 50 
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addressed——the question of statehood is a question for international 
lawyers. The work considers the implications of the argument for the 
international law on statehood and recognition, and concludes by reflecting 
more generally on the difficulties of developing a coherent understanding of 
the law in this area.  
 
II. The complex and uncertain international law on statehood 
 
7. There is general acceptance that the international law on statehood is both 
“complex and uncertain”,8 with scholars divided, in Jean d’Aspremont’s 
terms, between “facticists” and “legalists”, and “objectivists” and 
“subjectivists”.9 The first division is between jurists who claim that the State 
exists as a social fact before its capture by international law, and those who 
contend that the State is a creation of international law. The second concerns 
the question as to whether statehood can be objectively determined, or 
whether it is a consequence of the subjective determination of a third party. 
The dispute is played out in the debate over recognition. Two schools of 
thought can be observed. For adherents of the declaratory position, the State 
exists as a subject of international law as soon as it exists as a fact, 
independent of recognition (the “objectivist” approach). By way of contrast, 
the constitutive account holds that the legal status of State is constructed by 
way of recognition by already existing States (“subjectivist”). 
 8. Whilst d’Aspremont is clear that the debates between the facticists 
and legalists and objectivists and subjectivists take place at different levels and 
in very different terms, it is possible to develop a typology of approaches to 
statehood by reference to the two schisms. (Think in terms of a 2 x 2 square 
with “objectivists” and “subjectivists” up the side, and “facticists” and 
“legalists” along the bottom, giving 4 possible combinations.) For the 
objectivist/facticist, an emergent entity meeting the classic criteria of 
effectiveness (effectivité) is a state. The argument is seen, for example, in the 
work of Stefan Talmon, who concludes that statehood is constituted by the 
factual exercise of public authority over a population and territory.10 For the 
                                                        
8  Robert L. Howse and Ruti Teitel, Humanity Bounded and Unbounded: The 
Regulation of External Self-Determination under International Law, 7(2) Law 
& Ethics of Human Rights (2013), 51, 52. 
9  Jean d’Aspremont, The International Law of Statehood: Craftsmanship for 
the Elucidation and Regulation of Births and Deaths in the International 
Society, 29 Connecticut JIL (2014), 201, 205-6. 
10  Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Versus The Declaratory Theory of 
Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?, 75 British YIL (2004), 101, 117-8. In 
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objectivist/legalist, statehood is an objective legal fact.11 The argument is that 
statehood can be objectively determined in accordance with certain rules of 
general or customary international law——often understood to be reflected in 
the text of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,12 or 
a modified version of the “Montevideo formula”.13 The subjectivist/legalist 
approach differs from the objectivist/legalist approach in that, whilst it 
regards State as a legal category, the position does not conclude that it is 
possible to objectively determine which entities will be accepted as states. This 
is seen in John Dugard’s argument that admission to the United Nations 
resolves any legal controversy over the status of an emergent entity.14 Whilst 
                                                                                                                                
relation to the non-recognized state-like entities (Southern Rhodesia, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the South African Bantustans), 
Talmon concludes that as these met the criteria for statehood, they should be 
regarded as “states”, and that the majority of international lawyers would 
agree with this position (although this claim does not seem to be justified by 
an examination of the literature). Collective non-recognition is understood as 
a sanction imposed in response to some illegality in the formation or 
functioning of the entity which is opposable to the new state, with the 
objective being “to induce the State to dissolve itself and to return to the 
status quo ante”: ibid., 181. 
11  James Crawford, The Creation Of States In International Law, 2nd edition 
(2006), 5. (A State is not “a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; [it is] a legal 
status attaching to a certain set of affairs by virtue of certain rules or 
practices”.) 
12  Article 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
Adopted 26 December 1933. Reprinted (1934), 28 (Supplement) American 
JIL 75. “State”, as a legal person in international law, should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c) 
government; (d) and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
13  The collective non-recognition of state-like entities (the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, following an unlawful military intervention, and Southern 
Rhodesia, as a consequence of a denial of the right of peoples to self-
determination) is explained in terms of a change in the practice of states that 
results in a modification of international law doctrine on statehood. Cf. 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2010, 403, 
para.81 (“the illegality attached to the declarations of independence [by 
Southern Rhodesia, northern Cyprus, and Republika Srpska] stemmed […] 
from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the 
unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”). 
14  John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (1987), 80.  
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admission to the United Nations is a law-governed process, it is not possible 
to say in advance which entities will be admitted to membership. Finally, the 
subjectivist/facticist argument can be expressed in terms of the 
characterization of the pure (or extreme) constitutive position on recognition, 
which holds that the legal status of State is constructed by way of recognition 
by already existing states,15 and that states have absolute discretion in deciding 
which entities are to be recognized, without reference to rules of international 
law.16 
 9. The categorizations depend on two factors: (1) the function, if any, 
of a third party; and (2) the cognitive frame through which the issue is 
addressed. For the objectivist/facticist, statehood is a fact of the world: there 
is no need for a third party to confirm the existence of a new state, and no 
particular requirement for expert or specialized knowledge. For the 
objectivist/legalist, statehood is also a fact of the world, but it is a fact that 
must be established objectively in accordance with rules of international law—
—and therefore must be addressed through the cognitive frame of 
international law (i.e. in accordance with the mindset of the international 
lawyer). Both the subjectivist/legalist and subjectivist/facticist approaches 
accord primacy to the function of the third party observer: for the 
subjectivist/facticist, any entity can be “made” a State by way of recognition 
of already existing states; the same argument can be made in relation to the 
approach of the subjectivist/legalist—with the proviso that the issue must be 
addressed through the cognitive frame of international law, i.e. in accordance 
with rules established under international law. 
 10. The scheme demonstrates the way in which the different 
                                                        
15  L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I. Peace [1st ed.] (1905), 
109 (“[a] State is and becomes an international person through recognition 
only and exclusively”); also Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International 
Law (1947), 41 (“the constitutive act creative of statehood is an act of 
unfettered political will divorced from binding considerations of legal 
principle”). See also Christian Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to 
the International Community, 9 European JIL (1998), 491, 492. 
16  Crawford expresses the argument in the following way: the subjectively in the 
notion of the State inherent in the constitutive account effectively destroys 
the concept it seeks to define, as there are no constraints on the types of 
entities which can be recognized as states: Crawford, above n.11, 438. In the 
context of Palestine, however, Crawford argues that where the establishment 
of statehood is prevented by the serious default of another party to the 
prejudice of the self-determination unit, “circumstances can be imagined 
where the international community would be entitled to treat a new State as 
existing on a given territory, notwithstanding the facts” (emphasis added). Ibid., 
448. 
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approaches in the mainstream literature on the international law on statehood 
rely (if only implicitly) on divergent conceptual modes of enquiry that can 
result in different conclusions as the statehood claims of emergent entities.17 
Often these models are expressed as metaphor,18 and often those metaphors 
depend on developments in the natural sciences.19 It is then noteworthy that 
the explanatory accounts of the international law on statehood often rely on 
one particular metaphor: the idea of State as Person, which re-emerged in the 
19th century after the publication Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species By 
Means of Natural Selection in 1859.20 The figure of speech is common in the 
international law discipline;21 in the literature on statehood, it is said to be 
                                                        
17  See, on this point, Annelise Riles, Models and Documents: Artefacts of 
International Legal Knowledge, 48 ICLQ (1999), 805, 808. 
18  Max Black, More about Metaphor, 31 Dialectica (1977), 431. The function of 
metaphor is to make difficult concepts easier to understand by comparing 
one concept to another in a different domain that we are more familiar with. 
Contemporary metaphor theory tells us that the cognitive frames that help us 
to make sense of the natural and social worlds are, in large part, determined 
by metaphor—and that these are not arbitrary. George Lakoff, The 
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in: Anthony Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and 
Thought, 2nd edition (1993), 202, 243.  
19  J. Robert Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding (1954). 
20  The idea of State as Person can be traced back to Aesop’s fable of the Belly 
and the Members, through Christian ideas of human society, to the medieval 
conceptualization of the King’s Two Bodies. The trope fell out of favour 
following the publication of Isaac Newton’s Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica in 1687, when the dominant analogy became that of the 
machine (and we still refer to the machinery of government). The body 
politic metaphor re-emerged at the end of the 19th century, when the 
organism replaced the machine as the dominant metaphor for 
conceptualizing the social world and technological developments (telegraph 
and railways) and new discoveries (including the mammalian nervous system) 
led to new ways of thinking about a more interconnected social world. See 
Martin Landau, On The Use Of Metaphor In Political Analysis`, 28 Social 
Research (1961), 331; also A. D. Harvey, The Body Politic: Anatomy of a 
Metaphor, 275 (1603) Contemporary Review (1999), 85. 
21  Grotius, for example, defines the State as “a perfect body of free men”: The 
rights of war and peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations [1625] 
(1901), Bk. I. Ch. I. § XIV; Vattel refers to the State as a “moral person, who 
possesses an understanding and a will peculiar to herself, and is susceptible of 
obligations and rights”; Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles 
of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns [1758] (2008), Preliminaries, § 2. For a modern invocation, see 
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: 
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“omnipresent”.22 State as Person explains the references to the birth of new 
states,23 given that birth is the standard metaphor for making or creating 
physical objects or abstract entities,24 notwithstanding the self-evident 
deficiencies in the anthropomorphic analogy in this context.25 Reference to 
the birth of new states leads inevitably to an application of the law of the 
excluded middle (tertium non datur): just like natural persons, states are born,26 
                                                                                                                                
Towards a New Jus Gentium, 2nd edition (2013), 167. 
22  Jean D’Aspremont, above n.9, 212. 
23  George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980), 117. 
24  We see reference to the birth of states in the literature: see, for example, 
Phillip Jessup, The Birth of Nations (1974). The International Court of 
Justice has referred directly to the “birth of so many new states”: Legal 
Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, 16, para.52. The Court also 
referred to the “birth of the United Nations”, ibid., para.55. 
25  Edwin Dewitt Dickinson, The Analogy between Natural Persons and 
International Persons in the Law of Nations, 26 Yale LJ (1917), 564, 588 
(states have a population and a territory; they are immortal—none of this can 
be said of natural persons: “physical entities created by the natural processes 
of reproduction”). 
26  Stefan Talmon, above n.10, 125 (“[m]uch like the birth of a child, the 
creation of a State is predominantly a question of fact, not of law”). 
Elsewhere, Talmon writes that states, “like natural persons[,] attain legal 
personality at birth; that is, they are “born” subjects of international law”; 
ibid., 106. The State as Person metaphor has also been relied on by scholars 
who have a different understanding of the way in which statehood is 
established. Anne Peters refers to the idea that “wrongful birth” precludes 
statehood to explain a modification to the “Montevideo formula” by 
reference to the emergence of jus cogens norms; Anne Peters, “Statehood 
after 1989: “Effectivités” between Legality and Virtuality”, 3 Proceedings of 
the European Society of International Law (2010) [SSRN], 6. Consider also 
the choice of words of the constitutive scholar Christian Hillgruber in 
explaining the lack of statehood of Southern Rhodesia: “In the eyes of the 
international community, the State founded by Ian Smith’s regime suffered 
from an incurable ‘congenital defect’ […] that made it illegal under 
international law”. Christian Hillgruber, above n.15, 506. Finally, in relation 
to the idea that admission to the United Nations confirms statehood, note 
the words of Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas: in according Palestine 
the status of non-member observer state, the United Nations General 
Assembly had thus issued a “birth certificate to the Palestinian state”; quoted 
Jure Vidmar, Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood, 12 
10 Chinese JIL (2016)  
 
and it is contrary to common sense to conclude that a legal person can exist, or 
not, depending on the conclusions of an observing party——the principal 
argument against the constitutive account of recognition.27 Rather than begin 
with the image of Leviathan,28 and an explanation grounded in nineteenth 
century biological thought, the argument here is that we international lawyers 
should look to the insights from systems theory, specifically complexity 
theory—a way of thinking about the natural and social world that emerged 
towards the later end of the twentieth century—to model the emergence of 
new states. 
 
III. Complexity theory 
 
11. The argument from systems theory (specifically communications systems 
theory) is that we should think in terms of functional communications 
systems (the law system, the political system, the economics system, etc.) 
which have their own ways of understanding the world that results in each 
developing a distinctive rationale for dealing with problems. “Complex 
adaptive systems theory”, or “complexity theory”, or simply “complexity” is 
one variant of systems theory. Complexity emerged as a body of scientific 
thinking that further challenged the Newtonian paradigm of a Clockwork 
Universe that could be taken apart and subjected to analysis. Complex systems 
are often contrasted with complicated systems, like a car, which can be 
understood by examining the component parts and seeing how they work 
together. The prior assumption was that all systems were complicated systems, 
i.e. they were the “sum of their parts”, and that the future shape and form of 
any system could, in principle, be predicted—think of the mechanical models 
of the Solar Systems.29 The insight from scientists working on the weather 
and those looking at cells, the brain, ecosystems, etc. was that certain (chaotic 
                                                                                                                                
Chinese JIL (2013), 19. 
27  Stefan Talmon, above n.10, 102 (“[t]he most compelling argument against the 
constitutive theory is that it leads to relativity of the “State” as subject of 
international law”). The declaratory position has come to dominate the 
mainstream international law literature, largely as a reaction against the 
relativism permitted by the constitutive account. James Crawford argues that 
the relativism of the constitutive position is “a violation of common sense”, 
and, if it cannot be explained, “the position itself must be flawed”. James 
Crawford, above n.11, 21–22. 
28  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651). 
29  After losing money in the South Sea Bubble in the early part of the 
eighteenth century, Sir Isaac Newton is said to have commented: “I can 
calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people.”  
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and complex) systems could not be understood in a reductionist way.30 These 
systems were observed to be “greater than the sum of their parts”. It is not 
possible, for example, to understand an ecosystem (the patterned behaviours 
of organisms within a particular space) simply by examining the constituent 
elements.31 In a complex system, patterns are the result of the actions and 
interactions of constituent agents and their interactions with the environment 
“outside” of the system that produces complex behaviours at the edge of chaos: 
the place between entropy (where the order of the system decreases over 
time) and chaos (too much activity).  
 12. Complex systems are distinguished from other types of systems in 
part by the fact they are self-organizing. The capacity for self-organization allows 
complex systems to change their internal structures in response to 
developments within the system and events in the external environment. The 
structure of the system (the positions, actions and reactions of agents) occurs 
spontaneously as the result of the interactions of the parts of the system as 
they react to the flow of information through the system. The capacity for 
self-organization is the property of a complex system that enables it to process 
and make sense of information in order to develop or change in response to 
changes in the environment. The idea of “emergence” is used to describe the 
patterns, structures and properties seen at the level of the system that cannot 
be deduced from examining the individual component elements alone.32 The 
structure of a complex system is not then the result of some a priori design or 
the decisions of a “central controller”33 or “guiding hand”; it is a consequence 
of the actions and interactions of agents as they react to the flow of 
                                                        
30  Chaos theory observes that the elements of certain systems, the weather is 
the paradigmatic example, sometimes combine to produce unpredictable 
consequences, and that small inputs can have disproportionately large 
outputs. This idea is referred to as non-linearity, or (metaphorically) the  
‘butterfly ffect’, after the title of a paper by Edward Lorenz, whereby the 
flapping of the wings of a butterfly in Brazil is said to cause a tornado in 
Texas. See, generally, James Gleik, Chaos: The Amazing Science of the 
Unpredictable (1997). 
31  John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive Systems: An 
Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (2007), 10. (“The ability 
to collect and pin to a board all of the insects that live in the garden does 
little to lend insight into the ecosystem contained therein”.) 
32  Jeffrey Goldstein, Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues, 1 
Emergence (1999), 49, 58. 
33  Cliff Hooker, Introduction to Philosophy of Complex Systems, in: Cliff 
Hooker (ed.), Philosophy of Complex Systems (2011), 3, 42. 
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information through the system—and the interactions between the system 
and the external environment.  
 13. Through the actions and reactions of component agents, complex 
systems evolve over time—often quickly and dramatically, and often as the 
result of seemingly minor events in the external environment.34 The future 
shape and structure of a complex system cannot therefore be predicted. That 
is not to say that the evolution of a complex system is unpredictable. Three 
issues limit their future shape and form: their history, environment, and the 
presence of attractors. These establish the system’s “state space”: the range of 
possible futures open to the system. The concept of hierarchy also has a 
particular meaning when applied to complex systems. However we think 
about the relationships between complex systems (as agents in higher systems, 
or cross-cutting systems with tangled interactions, etc.),35 a complex system is, 
by definition, functionally autonomous: where there is an external controlling 
power, a system cannot be understood as a complex system.   
 14. When agents in a complex system act they do so in a thinking way, 
i.e. they are not simply reacting to information received. Where the 
interactions of actors create new patterns in response to new information, the 
system as a whole is said to have learnt and adapted and evolved. Learning is 
not possible without some form of memory that contains information that is 
important to the existence of the system. In order to adapt, evolve and 
change—and not simply mirror the environment—the system must have a 
memory, and therefore a history.36 The history of the system helps to 
determine its structure, representing the remembering by the system of the 
processes of self-organization that resulted in its extant structures and 
processes. That history constrains the possible futures of the system: path 
dependency means that the future of a complex system depends, in part, on its 
past.  
 15. The objective of complexity theory is to explain the emergence and 
functioning of complex systems. The insights from complexity theory 
thinking have been applied in a wide variety of contexts, in both the natural 
and the social sciences—to economic systems, the World Wide Web, and to 
                                                        
34  Where significant changes in the structure of the system occur in response to 
events in the external environment we can refer to a point of bifurcation: 
Göktug Morçöl, What Is Complexity Science? Postmodernist or 
Postpositivist?, 3 Emergence (2001), 104, 113. 
35  W. Brian Arthur, et al., Introduction, in W. Brian Arthur, et al. (eds.), The 
Economy as an Evolving Complex System II (1997), 1, 4. 
36  Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex 
Systems (1998), 91-92. 
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human societies, whether organized at the local or global level. There is, 
though, no paradigmatic science or philosophy of complexity, nor any agreed 
definition of the complex adaptive system, and no consensus as to the ways in 
which complex systems behave. At their most basic, complex systems can be 
understood as networks of interacting agents that are capable of adapting in 
response to the actions of others.37 They have the following characteristics: 
(1) complex systems are self-organizing, emergent systems; (2) they produce 
and use information from their internal and external environments; and (3) 
they adapt their functioning through learning processes.38 The key point is 
that agents are, to some degree, autonomous, whilst interacting directly and 
indirectly with other actors and agents, making the overall behaviour of the 
system difficult to predict. The argument here is that law and politics are 
complex systems and that this has important implications for how we model 
the emergence of new states.  
 
IV. The “state” as the joining of law and politics systems 
 
16. From the time of Hugo Grotius, the idea of the State has been understood 
by international lawyers as an independent political community, organized in a 
particular territory, under a coercive system of government that operates 
through law, and which represents that community with similar communities. 
Statehood is understood in terms of the internal and external expressions of 
sovereign authority. Within the state, sovereignty is the exclusive right to 
exercise coercive political power. Outside of the state, it expresses the idea of 
membership in the international community. The criteria for statehood are: 
population; territory; independent government; and a legal system that is not 
subject to the authority of the legal system of another state. This 
understanding is generally reflected in the literature and forms the basis of the 
“Montevideo formula”. Whilst we might conceptualize the idea of State in any 
number of ways——through observing actors or actions, for example——the 
argument here is that we should model State in terms of the co-evolution and 
coexistence of systems of law and politics. This understanding is captured by 
                                                        
37  Francis Heylighen, Paul Cilliers and Carlos Gershenson, Philosophy and 
Complexity, in Jan Bogg and Robert Geyer (eds.) Complexity, Science and 
Society (2007), 117, 125. 
38  Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (2009), 12-13. For similar 
definitions, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at 
the Edge of Order and Chaos (1992), 11; Neil Johnson, Simply Complexity: 
A Clear Guide to Complexity Theory (2009), 13-16; and Paul Cilliers, What 
Can We Learn From A Theory Of Complexity?, 2 Emergence (2000), 23, 24. 
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the references to the “sovereign and independent” state——from Vattel’s Le 
droit des gens,39 to the United Nations  Declaration on Friendly Relations.40 It 
reflects two ideas: (1) that there is a functionally independent political 
community, with a coercive system of government; and (2) that the 
government operates through law, and that the law system is also functionally 
independent. Expressed in the language of systems theory: State can be 
represented as the coupling of the law and politics systems under a 
constitution.41  
 17. The distinctive claim here is that law and politics are complex 
systems—and that this insight has important implications for how we 
understand the emergence of new states. Take the example of the law system. 
We can observe that certain law actors and institutions (legislatures, judges, 
etc.) produce law norm communications directed at the subjects of the law 
system, and that in doing so they follow rules, but act with some autonomy. 
In the terminology of complexity theory, these law actors and institutions are 
agents: the basic units of any complex system. We can further observe that 
certain law agents are in an on-going relationship with other law agents, i.e. 
they react directly to the law norm communications of other agents (courts 
and parliaments, for example). We can understand this on-going relationship 
in terms of a network (in the ordinary meaning of the term). The patterns of 
communications promulgated by law agents in a networked relationship can 
be framed as the “law system”: the emergent, undirected, pattern of law 
normative communications adopted by law authorities (legislatures, 
administrative bodies, courts, and others) and applied to subjects. This (“law”) 
system can be mapped or modelled as a pattern of law normative 
communications between law authorities and subjects: “It is unlawful for X to 
kill Y”, “It is unlawful for A to break their contractual arrangement with B”, 
etc., etc. The pattern is not the result of the decisions of any central controller 
or guiding hand—neither the legislature nor Supreme Court is able to control 
the shape of the entire law system—it emerges through the actions and 
interactions of a network of law agents: legislatures, courts and tribunals, etc.  
 18. In order to act and react, law actors and institutions must be able to 
                                                        
39  Emer de Vattel, above n.21, Bk. I. Ch. I. § 4. 
40  GA Res 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations, 24 October 1970. 
41  For a similar argument (albeit developed within the closed systems theory of 
autopoiesis), see Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, Volume 2, translated 
by Rhodes Barrett (2013), 73; also Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of 
Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological 
Perspective (2011). 
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process information in order to decide what to do next. Where the 
interactions of these agents create new patterns in response to new 
information, the law system can be said to have learnt and adapted and 
evolved. Learning is not possible without some form of memory, which is 
stored and dispersed throughout the system.42 The capacity for self-
organization allows a complex system to change its internal structures in 
response to developments within the system and to events in the external 
environment. As it evolves, the law system builds on its collective memory, 
changing its structure and form as agents react to the flow of information 
through the system—although always within the boundaries of what is 
understood to be possible (the system’s state space). This is seen most clearly 
in the common law,43 and the related judicial principle of stare decisis.44 The 
memory of the law system (the history of previous actions and interactions) is 
dispersed throughout: in statutes, court judgments, practitioner manuals and 
academic textbooks. System memory provides feedback to law actors and 
institutions as to how they should behave (higher courts bind lower courts, 
legal rules are interpreted logically and in accordance with precedent, etc.),45 
but without determining future behaviour in all circumstances—constitutions 
are revised or replaced,46 legislatures adopt radical law reform, and supreme 
courts overturn long-established precedent. In other words, law is an 
emergent, complex, self-organizing system in which a network of actors 
capable of responding to other actors and other systems operate with no 
overall guiding hand, giving rise to complex collective behaviour that can be 
observed in patterns of law norm communications.  
 19. Similar points can be made about the politics system—which, let it 
not be forgotten, operates (legitimately) through the complex law system. The 
politics system can be understood as the emergent pattern of regulatory 
communications promulgated by political authorities (the government) to 
                                                        
42  Paul Cilliers, above n.36, 11. 
43  Daniel M. Katz et al., Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects And The 
“Evolution” Of The Law: Toward A Positive Theory Of Judicial Social 
Structure, 24 Georgia State University LR (2007-2008), 977. See also J.B. 
Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the 
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 
Vanderbilt LR (1996), 1407, 1471. 
44  Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa LR (2000-1), 601. 
45  J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity, above n.3, 894-5.  
46  Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative 
Law, 54 Duke LJ (2005), 913, 932. 
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subjects (the governed). There is no single guiding hand or omnipotent 
power, as regulations can be adopted by legislatures, executives and 
administrative bodies. In the words of Niall Ferguson: “Regardless of whether 
it is a dictatorship or a democracy, any large-scale political unit is a complex 
system.”47 Collectively binding decisions emerge as political actors and 
institutions process information, often relying on feedback loops.48 The 
system has its own memory, which limits the possible scope of future 
decisions, and its own ways of thinking. Political systems can change in 
unexpected ways (often quickly)—consider the democratic revolutions during 
the so-called “Arab Spring”.49 To survive, a politics system must adapt and 
evolve with other systems in the world. Finally, the boundaries of political 
authority are not always clearly demarcated. Politics systems are open systems, 
interacting with other politics systems and political communications at one 
level can form part of the politics system at another—consider the way in 
which global communications are part of domestic politics on such subjects as 
military and humanitarian interventions, climate change, and commitments for 
overseas development assistance.  
 
V. The emergence of new states 
 
20. Systems theory directs us to think about the State in terms of the joining 
of the law and politics systems under the constitution; complexity that these 
are open, emergent systems that develop without any central controller or 
guiding hand. From the perspective of complexity theory, the emergence of 
new states must be understood as a two-stage process: first, we must be able 
to see the patterns of regulatory communications adopted by law and politics 
actors and institutions; second, we need to allocate meaning to those patterns 
                                                        
47  Niall Ferguson, Complexity and Collapse Empires on the Edge of Chaos, 89 
Foreign Affairs (2010) 18, 26. For a useful introduction to complexity applied 
to the politics system, see Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani, Complexity and 
Public Policy: A New Approach to 21st Century Politics, Policy and Society 
(2012). 
48  Complex systems rely on negative and positive feedback loops. Positive 
feedback is self-reinforcing, causing pressure for change in the same 
direction; negative feedback is stabilizing, creating pressure for the system to 
return to its previous position. Moreover, complex systems are non-linear: 
small inputs can have disproportionately large effects (the so-called butterfly 
effect), and an apparently stable system can change suddenly, often in 
unpredictable ways. 
49  Seva Gunitsky, Complexity and Theories of Change in International Politics, 
5 International Theory (2013), 35.  
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to decide whether an emergent entity can be regarded as a “state”—and we do 
so (inevitably) with the mindset of an international lawyer, i.e. we are looking for 
law and politics systems in order to observe a state—as opposed to simply 
looking at patterns of communications of law and politics actors and 
institutions. What matters is how we frame these systems: how we separate 
law and politics systems from the background noise of world society (the 
totality of law, politics and other systems and communications that structure 
and give meaning to human societies) in order to make sense of the 
phenomenon we are observing.  
 21. The first thing is to separate the law and politics systems from the 
environment. We must enquire whether, as a fact of the world, there are 
patterns of regulatory directives adopted by law and politics institutions that 
are applied to subjects—this distinguishes claims to sovereign authority from 
(a) the exercise of naked power by the “bandit”;50 and (b) non-territorial 
governance systems which do not coercively enforce their regulatory norms. 
There must be, as a social reality, law and politics actors and institutions 
promulgating authority directives to subjects, with those authority directives 
being coercively enforced. In the absence of de facto coercive power over 
subjects, there is no politics system (properly understood)—and no claim to 
statehood for emergent entities.51 
 22. The separation of systems of law and politics from the wider 
environment is no easy task. As a result of their incompressibility (complex 
systems cannot be simplified without losing some element that makes them 
complex) and open nature (agents sometimes interact directly with agents and 
elements outside of the system, including with other systems), any description 
of a complex system and its boundaries inevitably involves the making of 
choices by the observer “framing” the system.52 It follows that the boundaries 
of a complex system are both a function of the operations of the system 
(there must be patterned behaviour that can be observed) and the 
understanding imposed by the observer when separating the system from its 
environment. The fact of observation is integral to the identification of 
complex systems, including the complex systems of law and politics. 
Moreover, given the need to simplify a complex system in order to describe it 
                                                        
50  See on this point, Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, transl. 
Anders Wedberg (1999), 31. 
51  This work does not consider whether entities such as Poland (1939-45), 
Kuwait (1990-1), or Somalia (1991-) should continue to be regarded as 
“states” where they lack an effective political system. 
52  Paul Cilliers, Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism, 22 Theory, Culture 
& Society (2005), 255, 258.  
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and the open nature of complex systems, it is possible for there to be different 
descriptions by different observers, relative to the perspective from which the 
description is made—and no reason to conclude that each observer will see 
the same version of the system, or, in cases of disagreement, to prefer one 
version or vision of the system or boundary to another. The fact that complex 
systems cannot be modelled perfectly means that any description of a 
complex system will then involve the exercise of subjective judgment by the 
observer framing the system. 
 23. Once we are satisfied that (as a fact of the world) there are patterns 
of regulatory communications adopted by law and politics institutions and 
applied to subjects, we need to make sense of those patterns of 
communication. The establishment of statehood (when understood from the 
perspective of systems theory) involves the allocation of meaning to the 
actions of law and politics actors and institutions through the cognitive frame 
of international law, i.e. in accordance with the understanding of international 
lawyers. The point is significant. International law is the paradigmatic complex 
system, emerging through the actions and interactions of states and other 
international law actors as they react to new information and new events. The 
international law system evolves over time, adapting to developments within 
the system and the wider environment, but in ways that cannot be predicted. 
This is seen clearly in relation to the formation of customary international law, 
a “decentralized[,] bottom-up process” (in the words of Michael Wood),53 
which develops through the “actions and reaction” of states,54 without the 
need for any central controller or guiding hand. All states may contribute, and 
it is difficult for any one State to exercise a decisive influence. The emergent 
nature of international custom is confirmed by the fact that its content is not 
contained in a central registry (cf. the United Nations Treaty Collection), but 
dispersed throughout the system—in judgments of courts and tribunals and in 
the writings of publicists, including textbooks and reports by bodies such as 
the International Law Commission and the International Law Association. 
This constitutes the memory of the international law system and, like all 
memories, it is partial and selective (some issues are remembered, some 
forgotten). System memory informs the on-going practices of states, which 
operate in accordance with international law rules, limiting the possibilities of 
                                                        
53  Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, First report on formation and evidence 
of customary international law, International Law Commission, Sixty-fifth 
session UN Doc. A/CN.4/663, 17 May 2013, para.96. 
54  Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Elements of Custom and the Hague Court, 31 
Zeitschrift für Auslandisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1971), 
810, 812 (“the practice of States is built of their actions and reactions”). 
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future actions and reactions.  
 24. In the hypothetical state of nature, it might have been possible to 
conceptualize the emergence of new systems of law and politics (and 
therefore new states) in isolation from other law and politics systems. This is 
no longer the case. The globalization of sovereignty means that all 
permanently inhabited territories are subject to the claims of already existing 
law and politics systems. We are required then to make sense of the 
emergence of new systems of law and politics against the background noise of 
the law and politics systems of already existing territorial states. This requires 
that we reorient our analysis away from considerations of a “right” to 
territorial integrity versus a “right” to statehood to consider the conflicting 
claims to constitutional authority by the emergent entity (which must 
demonstrate that it has authority) and that of the already existing State (where 
the focus must be on the loss of authority).  
 25. The standard accounts in international law provide that statehood is 
established where we observe a new independent political community, 
organized in a particular territory, under a coercive system of government that 
operates through law, and which is able to represent the community with 
similar communities. Controversies in relation to the international status of a 
political entity do not normally concern the question as to whether it has a 
system of “law”—although this point has been come before the European 
Court of Human Rights in relation to the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus.55 The focus will then be on the nature of the politics system. The 
traditional approach of the international law system was to understand 
statehood in terms of effectiveness (effectivité): the coercive use of political 
power within the State and the possibilities of engaging with other sovereign 
political communities in the international community.56 In the language of 
systems theory, a new State could be observed where a government adopted 
binding decisions in the form of law that were coercively enforced against a 
population.  
 26. The last 50 years, has, though, seen a dilution of the importance of 
effectiveness, with considerations of legitimate authority now both 
supplementing and undermining claims to statehood: an ineffective but 
legitimate political community may be recognized as a State (Guinea-Bissau, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), whilst an effective but illegitimate political 
community may not be recognized (Southern Rhodesia, Turkish Republic of 
                                                        
55  Protopapa v. Turkey, App. No. 16084/90, Judgment 24 February 2009. 
56  See Robert J. Oppenheim, above n.15, 112-3 (a community able to establish 
itself “safely and permanently” and to exclude the authority of the already 
existing State has a claim to statehood).  
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Northern Cyprus, and Transdniestria). The international law system is not 
only concerned with the factual existence of coercive power, but also the 
justification for the exercise of that power. The politics systems of emergent 
entities must (now) make a claim to legitimate political authority.57 The 
paradigmatic examples are Sothern Rhodesia and the South African 
Bantustans of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. Despite 
exercising effective control over a territory and population, these entities were 
not recognized as states as they were established in violation of the principle 
of self-determination of peoples.58 This is often explained in terms of the 
influence of jus cogens norms on the law of statehood: an entity will not be 
recognized as a State where the circumstances of its “creation” violate an 
international law norm of jus cogens standing, including the prohibition on 
systematic racial discrimination and violations of the right of peoples to self-
determination (at least in the colonial context).59 But there is another way of 
understanding the non-recognition of these entities: Sothern Rhodesia and the 
Bantustans were not accepted as states because it could not plausibly be 
argued that the government represented the people of the territory. In the 
language of systems theory: the international community could not see a 
pattern of political communications promulgated by the government and 
accepted by the governed, even if it could see the exercise of coercive power 
and an effective legal regime. In other words, the international law system 
could not see a politics system. This is significant, as where the international 
community cannot see a politics system (properly understood), it cannot see a 
new state.  
 27. In relation to the State against which a claim to statehood is made, 
the international law doctrine and practice outlines five circumstances in 
which the authority (the “right to rule”) of an already existing State will not be 
accepted.60 First, in cases of separation, where a new State is created with the 
                                                        
57  See, for example, EC “Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union” 31 ILM (1992), 1486; also Badinter 
Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on Yugoslavia 
Opinion No. 10, 4 July 1992, para.4. Reprinted 4 European JIL (1993), 90. 
58  John Dugard, South African Bantustan Policy, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2011), para.10.  
59  See, for example, David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-determination 
(2002), 442; also John Dugard and David Raic, The Role of Recognition in 
the Law and Practice of Secession, in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.) Secession: 
International Law Perspectives (2006), 94, 101. 
60  Readers might not agree with the list presented here, but would (hopefully) 
accept that there are some circumstances in which the authority (i.e. the right 
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consent of the existing state. Recent examples include Montenegro and South 
Sudan. We can understand the emergence of these new states in terms of a 
revised understanding (a redrawing, if you like) of the boundaries of the law 
and politics systems of Serbia and Montenegro and Sudan respectively. 
Secondly, the authority of a State will not be recognized where the 
relationship between the State and the entity is a “colonial” one.61 Thirdly, a 
State can repudiate the bonds of authority with one part of the population by 
making no pretence to govern in the interests of that part of the population. 
This is explained in terms of the “remedial right” of secession.62 Fourthly, 
there are occasions, for example in the case of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, when the international community will conclude that the 
existing State has undergone a process of dissolution. In these exceptional 
circumstances, there are factually no law and politics systems claiming 
authority over subjects; there is an authority vacuum that can be filled by 
other systems of authority. Finally, the nature of the politics system of an 
existing State can result in the international community refusing to 
acknowledge that the exercise of power is accepted by a majority of the 
population: the apartheid regime in South Africa is the paradigmatic example. 
Whilst the nature of the regime does not affect the status of the territory as a 
state, it is relevant when considering any “transfer” of sovereignty authority to 
                                                                                                                                
to rule) of an already existing State will not be accepted in international law. 
61  In a number of resolutions in the 1960s, the United Nations General 
Assembly made clear that a colonial power did not enjoy legitimate authority 
over a non-self-governing territory, unless the population expressly 
consented to the continuing exercise of political power by the metropolitan 
state. See, GA Res. 1514 (XV), adopted 14 December 1960, Declaration on 
the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; and GA Res. 
1541 (XV), adopted 15 December 1960, Principles which should guide 
Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter. 
62  Where a territorially concentrated group is systematically excluded from 
political life, secession is a potential remedy of last resort in cases of serious 
human rights abuses against members of the group. The right is implied by 
the so-called “saving clause” in GA Res. 2625 (XXV), adopted October 24, 
1970, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations. For judicial support for the remedial right to secession, 
see Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998) 2 SCR 217, para.134; and Kevin 
Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon, African Commission On Human And 
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 266/2003, 27 May 2009, para.194. 
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an emergent entity.63  
 28. The international law on statehood is required then to explain the 
ways in which the conflicting and overlapping claims to constitutional 
authority can be addressed and resolved. These conflicts fall into one of four 
categories. (1) Circumstances where neither the existing State nor the 
emergent entity can make a claim to authority. Where there is no evidence 
that the population accepts the authority of the emergent entity, the 
international community cannot see a new state, for the reason that it cannot 
see a politics system—according to its own conception of what a politics 
system represents. Examples include Southern Rhodesia and the South 
African Bantustans. This is the case even when the existing states cannot 
make a claim to legitimate authority—the United Kingdom as the colonial 
power and South Africa apartheid state. (2) Circumstances in which the 
emergent entity cannot make a claim to governmental authority on the 
grounds that it is not functionally independent, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh and 
South Ossetia.64 An entity subject to the binding decisions of another politics 
system fails to fulfil the criterion of independence and thus does not possess a 
politics system (properly so-called): it is (at best) a sub-system of another 
system.65 In these cases, the territorial State remains the de jure sovereign, even 
if it fails to exercise de facto authority. (3) There will be circumstances in which 
an emergent entity appears to exercise de facto control and enjoy the support 
of the local population, but the territorial State also seems to continue to 
enjoy a degree of sovereign authority. Examples include Abkhazia66 and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.67 The concept of the de facto regime 
                                                        
63  See Christian Hillgruber, above n.15, 495. 
64  In relation to South Ossetia, the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia concluded was South Ossetia “not a 
state-like entity, but only an entity short of statehood” on the grounds that 
Russia’s control of the political decision-making process was systematic and 
permanent, and South Ossetia was not effective on its own 
account;Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia (September 2009), Vol. II, 134.  
65  Consider, for example, the description of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as 
“a satellite ‘puppet-state’ or even a de facto Armenian province”; Andriy Y 
Melnyk, Nagorny-Karabakh, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2013), para.10.  
66  See references to “state-like entity” (Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission, above n.64) and “stabilized de facto regime” (Angelika Nußberger, 
Abkhazia, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2013), 
para.27). 
67  See reference to “local de facto government” in relation to Northern Cyprus: 
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developed by Jochen Frowein is perhaps most useful to describe an emergent 
entity that controls a more or less clearly defined territory, but which is not 
recognized by the international community as a state.68 (4) Finally, there will 
be situations in which the international community acknowledges the loss of 
sovereign authority by the existing State and the emergence of a new entity 
that enjoys the support of the local population and capacity to exercise 
coercive governmental powers. In these circumstances, the international 
community will accept and recognize the emergence of a new state. 
 29. In evaluating whether or not a claim to statehood has been 
established as a matter of international law the following insights from 
complexity emerge. First, we must check whether, as a fact of the world, there 
are patterns of law and politics communications promulgated by actors and 
institutions and applied to subjects. Second, we must consider whether we can 
frame those patterns of communications as systems in their own right and not 
merely random communications or subsystems of other systems. Third, we 
must enquire whether the law and politics systems are coupled under a 
constitution in order to distinguish the exercise of naked power from claims 
to legitimate authority (politics establishes the scope of effective law norms 
through executive enforcement; law translates power into legitimate political 
action). We can then ask whether there is evidence that the population accepts 
the constitutional regime as an authority for them. In these circumstances, the 
emergent entity has a claim to authority. We can then consider the claims of 
the existing state. Here there is a presumption in favour of stability and the 
status quo, as the international law system—a system that functions to avoid 
violent conflict and resolve disputes69—will not lightly accept a loss of 
authority by a state. We must then ask whether there is clear evidence that the 
existing State no longer enjoys authority in relation to the population. Where 
it is not evident that the State no longer enjoys sovereign authority, an 
emergent entity that enjoys legitimate political authority will remain in a 
suspended condition of statu nascendi.  
 
VII. The “recognition” of new states 
 
                                                                                                                                
Frank Hoffmeister, Cyprus, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2009), para.29.  
68  See Jochen Frowein, Das De Facto-Regime im Völkerrecht (1968); and 
Jochen A. Frowein, De Facto Regime Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2013). 
69  See, for example, Anthony D’Amato, Groundwork for International Law, 
above n.1, 653.  
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30. Complexity theory provides us then with a new way of thinking about the 
emergence of new states in the international community in a way that helps 
make sense of the relevant doctrine and practice. The approach from 
complexity suggests a two-stage process for evaluating the statehood claims of 
emergent entities: (1) we must be able to observe patterns of regulatory 
communications between law and politics actors and institutions and subjects; 
and (2) we are required to allocate meaning to those patterns. Where it can be 
observed that functionally autonomous law and politics systems operate with 
the consent of the subjects of the constitutional regime—and the already 
existing State no longer enjoys the right to rule, we can conclude that the 
statehood claims of the emergent entity have been established. Where the 
autonomy of the law and politics systems cannot be established, or it is not 
clear that the regime operates with the consent of subjects, or it is not clear 
that the already existing State no longer enjoys the right to rule, statehood 
cannot be established—and de jure territory sovereignty is retained by the 
already existing state.  
 31. The question is “who decides”? Who decides when an emergent 
entity should remain part of the territorial state, or be accepted as a de facto 
regime, or recognized as a “state”? The response of the “objectivists” (to use 
Jean d’Aspremont’s term) would be that “no one decides”: statehood is either 
an objective fact of the world (evidenced by effectivité) or established in 
accordance with objective legal criteria. The analysis developed here, from the 
perspective of complexity, demonstrates, however, that when we 
conceptualize the “sovereign and independent” State in terms of the joining 
of the law and politics systems under a constitution, State does not exist as an 
objective reality: it is observed by a third party trying to make sense of the 
patterns of law and politics communications against the background noise of 
world society. Given the inherent indeterminacy in the modelling of the 
complex systems of law and politics, we cannot be certain that we have 
correctly identified emergent and autonomous systems of law and politics. In 
other words, once we accept that law and politics are complex systems, we 
must reject any argument that a State can have an objective reality, either 
because it exists as a fact of the world, or as an objective category that all 
reasonable observers would recognize, given that different actors may come 
to different conclusions as to the statehood claims of emergent entities, 
depending on the meaning they allocate to the patterns of law and politics 
communications that they can observe.  
 32. The conclusion locates the argument firmly within the subjectivist 
literature, which, as previously noted, can be divided between those writers 
who argue that statehood is constituted through the recognition of an 
emergent entity as a State (nothing more is required); and those whose 
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position is that statehood is established by admission to the United Nations, 
accepting that it is not possible to say in advance which entities will be 
admitted to membership. The analysis from complexity takes a different 
approach. It rejects the contention that statehood can be constituted by 
recognition alone: whether taken individually or collectively through 
admission to the United Nations. Complexity tells us that the identification of 
the complex systems of law and politics for the purposes of establishing 
statehood requires (1) the factual reality of patterned behaviour; (2) the 
observation of that patterned behaviour; and (3) an evaluation of that 
patterned behaviour through the cognitive frame of international law. 
Moreover, this is not the first article to make this point (albeit in very different 
terms). 
 33. In his paper “Recognition of States in International Law”, which is 
substantially reprinted in Recognition in International Law,70 Hersch Lauterpacht 
argues that whilst recognition is declaratory that an emergent entity fulfils the 
necessary criteria for statehood established by international law, it has 
constitutive effect for the commencement of international rights and duties, 
and in that sense is constitutive of statehood for the entity in question. 
Recognition is not then a question of unfettered (political) discretion, but of 
establishing whether the required conditions exist for the identification of 
statehood: independent government, effective authority, and defined territory. 
Given the absence of a centralized political or judicial authority, the functional 
responsibility to accord the status of State to political communities is 
undertaken by states (separately) on behalf of the international community. 
Lauterpacht concludes that once a State had observed the relevant conditions 
of statehood in an emergent entity, it is under a duty of recognition,71 and that 
this duty exists as a matter of law and practice—a position that finds limited 
support in the literature.72 This misstep, of arguing for the recognition of a 
duty of recognition, should not blind us, however, to his main point: that the 
recognition of new states involves the evaluation of facts concerning the 
exercise of independent governmental authority in relation to a particular 
territory for the purpose of establishing whether the conditions for statehood 
                                                        
70  Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947), Part I. 
71  Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 Yale LJ 
(1943-4) 385, 454 (“recognition, while constitutive of the international 
personality of the new State, is declaratory of an existing physical fact. If this 
fact is present, the established States fall under a duty to declare its existence 
and thus to bring into being the international rights and duties of the new 
State.”). 
72  See further Patrick Capps, Lauterpacht’s Method, 82 British YIL (2012), 248. 
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have been met,73 and that, in this evaluation, the observing State is entitled to 
exercise its discretion: “This is a judicial discretion, however, aimed at 
ascertaining the existence of the relevant facts.”74 Chinese scholar Ti-Chiang 
Chen expresses a similar idea, when he concludes that the requirements for 
the recognition of new states are established by the reference the international 
law criteria for statehood—acknowledging that scholars may differ as to the 
precise formulation. The application of the requirements for statehood 
cannot, however, be separated from the factual realities: “recognition cannot 
be divorced from fact.”75 Through recognition “a State declares, admits, and 
accepts a state of facts and outwardly manifests the mental comprehension of 
such facts”.76  
 34. Lauterpacht’s solution to the problem of recognition was to 
propose the “collectivization of the process”: recognition should be 
undertaken by the highest executive or legislative organs (not a judicial body) 
of a “universal international organization”, with entities admitted to the 
organization and therefore statehood “by an appropriate majority”.77 This has 
now become the mainstream position in the literature on statehood. Jure 
Vidmar summarizes the point this way: “when an entity joins the UN, this 
ends any doubt pertaining to its legal status—it definitely is a state”.78 There 
are two possible justifications for this: first, drawing on the conclusions of the 
International Court of Justice in the Reparation case, that the “vast majority of 
the members of the international community” can bring into being an entity 
possessing objective international personality, with that legal personality 
opposable to all states;79 second, that a majoritarian principle applies in the 
practice of recognition in the case of admission to the United Nations.80 The 
                                                        
73  Lauterpacht argues that premature recognition is wrong, not only because it 
infringes the sovereignty of the territorial state, but also because it 
“acknowledges as an independent State” a political entity that fails to fulfil 
“the essential conditions of statehood”; Hersch Lauterpacht, above n.71, 392. 
74  Hersch Lauterpacht, above n.71, 407 (emphasis added). 
75  Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of Recognition (1951), 54. 
76  Ibid., 77. 
77  Hersch Lauterpacht, above n.71, 449. 
78  Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of 
New States in Post-Cold War Practice (2013), 38. 
79  Cf. Reparation For Injuries Suffered In The Service Of The United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1949, 174, 185. 
80  Hersch Lauterpacht, above n. 70, 403 (“a majority thus constituted ought to 
be treated as sufficient proof that the new State […] possesses the necessary 
qualifications entitling it to recognition”); also Crawford, above n. 11, 438 
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first depends on according a special significance to the admission process of 
the United Nations.81 The second on an application of a super-majoritarian 
principle, with writers referring to the possibility of a State emerging as an 
objective reality following “widespread recognition”,82 or with “quasi-
unanimous support”.83 In both cases, the argument is that the establishment 
of statehood through admission to the United Nations is opposable to those 
states that do not already accept that the entity is a state.  
 35. The idea that admission to the United Nations resolves any 
question of the statehood claims of an emergent entity, though superficially 
attractive, does not work as a matter of practice, law or principle. As a matter 
of practice, non-states have been full members of the United Nations (Belarus 
SSR and Ukraine SSR). As a matter of law, it is difficult to develop a 
compelling argument that admission constitutes an international law status 
opposable to all other states—the argument seems to be that, as co-members 
of the United Nations, states are required to deal with each other on the basis 
of equality within the Organization (but that is not the same as recognizing 
the other as a state). The requirements for admission to the United Nations 
(and, according to this argument, the requirements for statehood) are 9 
positive votes in the UN Security Council (out of a possible 15); the absence 
of a veto by one of the five permanent members; and a two-thirds majority of 
the members present and voting in the General Assembly. Statehood depends 
on an application of a law-governed procedure—but it is not possible to say 
in advance which entities will be accepted as states. Finally, as a matter of 
principle, the United Nations cannot “constitute” statehood without reference 
to the facts on the ground (this is a central insight from complexity theory). 
The admission of the fictional State of Narnia by the appropriate procedural 
requirements of the United Nations Charter would not mean that Narnia was 
a State under international law. The conclusion must be that admission to the 
                                                                                                                                
(“There is no rule that majoritarian recognition (outside the framework of 
admission to the United Nations) is binding on third states.” (Emphasis added)). 
81  The argument of the United Nations Treaty Section of the Office of Legal 
Affairs is that whilst membership of an international organization is not 
normally determinant of statehood, membership of the United Nations is 
conclusive because of the onerous procedures for admission to the 
Organization: Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of 
Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, UN 
Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1 (1999), para.79. 
82  Marc Weller, Modesty Can be a Virtue: Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo 
Opinion?, 24 Leiden JIL (2011), 127, 130. 
83  James Crawford, above n.11, 438. 
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United Nations resolves problems of statehood as a practical matter (rather than 
as a matter of legal principle) allowing states and international law 
practitioners (and academics) to move forward with a shared understanding of 
the status of those political entities admitted to membership. Thus, for 
example, we are not required to deal with the status of Israel in legal disputes, 
notwithstanding the fact that it remains unrecognized by over 30 co-members 
of the United Nations.  
 36. Pragmatism is important here. In our analysis of the complexities of 
the world, there must be certain issues on which we international lawyers are 
agreed in order to engage in a meaningful discussion. There must, for 
example, be some relevance in the fact that Somaliland has not been 
recognized by any state, that the international community is divided in the 
status of Kosovo and Palestine, and that South Sudan has been admitted to 
the United Nations. The non-recognition of an emergent entity suggests (for 
whatever reason) that the international community does not regard a political 
community as a state. It would, then, be difficult to conclude that Moldavian 
Republic of Transdniestria or Nagorno-Karabakh are states given the absence 
of a single act of recognition by already existing states.84 The same point can 
be made in relation to Somaliland, notwithstanding that it is generally regarded 
as fulfilling the classic criteria of statehood.85 The conclusion that 
Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland are not states is not a 
function of non-recognition; it simply reflects a pragmatic reading of the 
practice of states, i.e. that it is difficult to conclude that an entity is a State 
where it is not recognized by any state. We can refer to this as the 
“mainstream” international law position, which will be reflected in the 
practice of states and in the academic writings on the subject. This rough 
consensus can, though, move to dissensus and a revised consensus, and it can 
do so rapidly.  
 37. The analysis from complexity leads inevitably to a defence of the 
                                                        
84  James Crawford, above n.11, 93. (“At least when the recognizing government 
is not acting in a merely opportunistic way, recognition is important evidence 
of legal status.”) Jure Vidmar draws a useful distinction between universal 
and widespread recognition: universal recognition confirms the emergence of 
a new state; widespread recognition “leads at least to ambiguity regarding the 
legal status of an entity”: Jure Vidmar, Explaining The Legal Effects Of 
Recognition, 61 ICLQ (2012), 361, 387. 
85  Crawford, above n.11, 417 (“[t]he notion of a de facto regime has been 
pressed to its ultimate—and Somaliland is not yet a state”); cf. Jan Amilcar 
Schmidt, Somalia, Conflict, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2013), para.24 (Somaliland fulfils the criteria of statehood elaborated in 
the “Montevideo formula”).  
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constitutive position and the associated possibility of the “grotesque 
spectacle” (in Hersch Lauterpacht’s terms) of an emergent entity being a State 
in relation to some states, but not others. Hans Kelsen was famously 
phlegmatic about this: “[s]ince we have to acknowledge the relativity of time 
and space[,] relativity of legal existence is no longer paradoxical”.86 Kelsen’s 
position was attacked by Lauterpacht, who concluded that the problem could 
not be “explained away amidst some complacency by questionable analogies 
to […] philosophical relativism”.87 The argument from complexity provides a 
better way of understanding why relativism is inevitable in the determination 
of the international status of emergent entities—and why it is not necessarily 
problematic. In the observation of emergent regimes claiming the right to 
rule, the requirement is to apply the generally accepted international law 
criterion for statehood to the observed patterns of regulatory 
communications. The analysis here showed that in the evaluation of the status 
claims of emergent entities there may be legitimate differences of opinion, 
depending on the cognitive understanding of the process of observation (i.e. 
the legal “test” being applied) and the patterns of behaviours being observed 
(the “facts” on the ground). Disagreement in relation, for example, to the 
status claims of Kosovo and Palestine does not concern the question as to 
whether the respective entity is a State or not (the entity is, after all, what it is); 
disagreement simply reflects a lack of agreement between observers as to 
whether the correct international law test for the establishment of statehood 
has been applied and/or a lack of agreement as to the factual conclusions of 
the observer evaluating the statehood claims of the emergent entity. 
                                                        
86  Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 
American JIL (1941), 605, 609. The allusion is to discoveries in the so-called 
new science in the early part of the twentieth century, specifically the 
publication of Albert Einstein’s Relativity: The Special and General Theory 
(1916). Scientific developments in the twentieth century have had limited 
influence on the metaphorical conceptualization of the social world, 
including within legal academia, possibly for the reason that the quantum 
world is beyond our everyday experience (from where we get out metaphors). 
The influence of the new science has mainly been by way of misapplication: 
we can never really know anything (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle); 
everything is relative (Einstein’s Theory of Relativity); and nothing really 
exists until it is observed (Schrödinger’s Cat). Notable exceptions to reliance 
on ideas and concepts from the new science include Anthony D’Amato, 
Counterintuitive Consequences of “Plain Meaning”, 33 Arizona LR (1991), 
529; and Lawrence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What 
Lawyers can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 Harvard LR (1989), 1.  
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Relativism describes the position and conclusions of the observer—not the 




38. This article began by outlining an understanding of State in terms of the 
coupling of the law and politics systems under a constitution. Whilst 
expressed in terms of systems theory, this reflects the general understanding 
of State held by international law scholars since the time of Grotius and the 
emergence of the idea of sovereign authority. The distinctive claim here is that 
law and politics are complex emergent systems. Complexity theory tells us that 
the identification of emergent systems requires both the fact of patterned 
behaviour reflecting the actions, reactions and interactions of actors and 
institutions and the observation of that patterned behaviour by a third party 
observer. Only then does it become meaningful to talk about a “system” that 
can be separated from the wider environment. The nature of complex systems 
means however that it can be difficult to be absolutely certain that we can 
really “see” autonomous systems of law and politics or identify an objective 
position from which the issue can be addressed: different observers can come 
to different conclusions as to whether the criteria for statehood have been 
established.  
 39. The approach from complexity led to the following insights. First, 
we should acknowledge that we are being asked to answer a particular 
question, i.e. we are asked to identify new “states”. Second, that we will 
inevitably examine the issue through the cognitive frame of international law, 
meaning that we are required address the problem with the mindset of an 
international lawyer (even if we regard states as facts of the world). Third, 
given that the international law system will be faced with the problem of the 
identification of new states in different circumstances over time and that 
different international law actors and institutions will attempt to “resolve” this 
problem (both as a matter of international law practice and doctrine), an 
emergent international law on statehood will develop as one part of general or 
customary international law to help us frame the question. In other words, the 
international law system will (some explicitly, often implicitly) develop a legal 
test for statehood that can be applied to new factual situations. There can be, 
however, differences of opinion between different international law actors and 
institutions as the relevant test to be applied—as well as to the relevant facts 
on the ground.  
 40. In the identification of new states, we can then outline the 
following conclusions drawing on our analysis from complexity. 
 41. First, there must be, as a social reality, law and politics actors and 
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institutions promulgating authority directives to subjects. We must be able to 
see coevolved and coexistent systems of law and politics coupled under a 
constitution before we can see a state. Consider, for example, the conclusion 
of the Badinter Committee that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emerged 
on 27 April 1992, “because that was the date on which Montenegro and 
Serbia adopted the Constitution of the new entry and because the relevant 
international agencies then began to refer to ‘the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’”.88 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was neither 
an objective fact, nor an artefact, constructed through recognition: its 
independent existence as a State was accepted at the point at which the 
international community could see the law and politics systems of a new State 
coupled under a constitution.  
 42. Second, the evaluation of the statehood claims of emergent entities 
must be undertaken through the cognitive frame of international law. In the 
traditional language of the international lawyer, the establishment of new 
states requires the identification of a new independent political community, 
organized in a particular territory, under a coercive system of government that 
operates through law, and which is able to represent the community with 
similar communities. In the language of systems theory, we are looking for 
new systems of law and politics joined under a constitution. Where there is 
more than one observer, there is no reason to conclude that each will frame 
the patterned communications of law and politics in the same way, given the 
inherent indeterminacy in the modelling of complex systems. Once we 
recognize that law and politics are complex systems, we must reject any 
argument that a State can have an objective reality: different actors may come 
to different conclusions. Complexity theory makes clear that there cannot be a 
single authoritative position from the which the question of statehood can be 
addressed—allowing for a plurality of perspectives and opinions and locating 
the analysis generally in line with the modified constitutive position outlined 
by Hersch Lauterpacht, i.e. that recognition involves the judicial-type process 
of applying law to facts—but with the acceptance of subjectivity and 
indeterminacy in both our understanding of the factual situation and the legal 
test to be applied.  
 43. Third, it is impossible to avoid disagreements as to whether this or 
that entity is, or is not, a state. This is not a consequence of the relativity of 
state, but of the fact that different observers can come to different conclusions 
as to whether we can frame observed patterns of communications as a “state”. 
Moreover, the multiplication of complexity that follows the recognition that 
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the observation of the complex systems of law and politics is undertaken 
through the cognitive frame of the complex international law system means 
that we can never be confident that we have found the “right” answer. In 
these conditions of uncertainty the only possibility is a turn to pragmatism in 
the case of disputed statehood claims, allowing us, for example, to accept that 
Palestine can be a party to the International Criminal Court without being a 
member of the United Nations, without needing to resolve the Palestinian 
Status Question.  
 44. Fourth, the model developed here to explain the emergence of new 
states through the cognitive frame of international law highlights the 
importance of sensitivity to changes in the ways in which the international law 
system conceptualizes the emergence of new states. This can be seen in the 
evolution of the thinking of the international law system about the nature of 
the domestic politics systems at the moment of the emergence of new states, 
in particular its refusal to regard communications between those with power 
and those subject to that power as a politics system, properly so called, in the 
absence of evidence that the relevant population accepts the exercise of 
governmental authority—the case of Southern Rhodesia and its Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in 1965 is the best example here.  
 45. Finally, complexity theory tells us that our model of the State as the 
joining of complex systems will always be incomplete, contingent and 
contestable, relieving the international lawyer of the sense that there is a 
definitive (yet to be identified) “test” that will be accepted by all international 
lawyers and which will give us the “right” answer in all circumstances. It 
follows that we international lawyers will inevitably continue to engage in 
ontological and epistemological contestations over the concept of state, and, 
try as we might to develop more complicated formulations, the international 
law on statehood is likely to remain both complex and uncertain.  
